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Guy Ben-Ari (Washington)
Politics and Defence R&D Policies.
The United States and Israel and Lessons for the
European Union
Dieser Beitrag verwendet das Bureaucratic-Politics-Paradigma zur Analyse von Forschungs- und
Entwicklungsprogrammen des militärischen Sektors. Gegenstand der Untersuchung sind einschlägige
Forschungs- und Entwicklungsprogramme in den USA und Israel sowie daraus ableitbare
Schlussfolgerungen für die Europäische Union, wo gegenwärtig Bestrebungen zur Initiierung militärischer
F&E-Programme auf Gemeinschaftsebene stattfinden. Das Bureaucratic-Politics-Paradigma ist ein
tauglicher Ausgangspunkt zum besseren Verständnis politischer Prozesse der Innovation im Bereich
nationaler Sicherheit: Es liefert einen systematischen Rahmen zur Erklärung, wie verschiedenen Elemente
des Regierungssystems in einem politischen System, in welchem politische Macht bewusst fragmentiert
und über eine große Anzahl von Akteuren verteilt ist, zu Entscheidungen kommen. Vor diesem Hintergrund
kommt der Beitrag zu dem Schluss, dass politische Entscheidungsfindung im Bereich militärischer F&E-
Investitionen auf einem Kompromiss zwischen unterschiedlichen Positionen verschiedener politischer
Interessen, unter anderem im Bereich der staatlichen Bürokratie, basiert. Positionen der politischen Spitze
steuern die Aktivitäten unterschiedlicher Elemente der Verwaltung einerseits zu einem gewissen Grad,
andererseits werden diese nicht automatisch und eins zu eins in Maßnahmen umgesetzt. Zur
Implementierung von F&E-Policies im Sinn ihrer Planung sind andauernde Verhandlungen und Wieder-
Verhandlungen zwischen politischen Amtsträgern, der Bürokratie, dem Militär, der Industrie und anderen
externen Interessengruppen notwendig.
Keywords: Sicherheitspolitik, Bureaucratic Politics, Forschung und Entwicklung, European Defence
Agency, Militärtechnologie
Defence, bureaucratic politics, research and development, European Defence Agency,
military technology
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1. Introduction
This paper will utilize the bureaucratic poli-
tics model to analyze the defence R&D policies
of two countries – the United States and Israel
– and to make recommendations, based on this
analysis, for the European Union as it initiates
defence R&D programmes at the European
level. It is not intended to make the case for or
against defence R&D at one level or another, or
to pass judgement on the case studies it de-
scribes. Rather, it is based on the recognition
that defence R&D is a component of the na-
tional security and innovation strategies of many
countries, and as such it is important to under-
stand the mechanisms through which policies
are created that affect it. Given the rise in recent
years of the U.S. defence R&D budget (from
just under $50 billion in 2001 to over $70 bil-
lion in 2005, which is 15 percent of the entire
U.S. defence budget), the prominence of defence
R&D in Israel’s national security strategy (spe-
cific figures are not made public), and the ini-
tiation of the first pan-European defence R&D
programs in the fall of 2005 (worth approxi-
mately 3 million Euros, and expected to rise in
the next few years), the time seems right to ini-
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tiate a dialogue on how defence R&D policies
are implemented.
The choice to use the bureaucratic politics
paradigm stems from its usefulness for under-
standing the politics of national security, includ-
ing innovation activities related to national se-
curity, particularly those of democratic govern-
ments where power is intentionally fragmented
and dispersed among a multitude of actors. By
viewing policy as something that is formulated
and implemented in a bargaining arena rather
than a command structure, through a process
that is fragmented and non-hierarchical, the
paradigm offers a systematic conceptual frame-
work that takes into account all relevant actors
in the defence policy realm.
The U.S. and Israel present interesting case
studies for analyzing defence R&D policies. In
both countries, political decisions were made
to create, train and equip national military forces
for both defensive as well as offensive tasks
ranging from full-scale war to various types of
low-intensity conflict. In both countries, the
political decision was taken to be as self-suffi-
cient as possible in defence equipment so as to
procure as much of it as possible on the domes-
tic marketplace. While each country had differ-
ent reasons for reaching this decision, the end
results were similar: today, both boast national
industrial bases that are not only capable of sup-
porting a large share of their defence require-
ments, but also constitute an important element
of their economic, defence and foreign policies.
Since there are striking differences in the econo-
mies, defence budgets, national security strate-
gies and government types of the two countries,
analyzing both is useful for the EU, which is
currently formulating a defence R&D policy for
a diverse Union of Member States. If the exam-
ples of the U.S. and Israel show that bureaucra-
cies are key actors in defence R&D policies, this
would strongly suggest that they will be key for
European defence R&D policies too.
The paper first looks at political rationale
for defence R&D investment using the bureau-
cratic politics paradigm. This paradigm views
decisionmakers as actors in the game of poli-
tics whose positions on political issues are de-
termined by bureaucratic interests. Actors pro-
mote those interests as part of a competition for
various stakes and prizes. Political decisions and
policy outcomes, according to the bureaucratic
politics paradigm, are reached through a com-
promise between different positions held by the
various actors. Next, the paper describes the
American and Israeli defence R&D frameworks
and uses the bureaucratic political paradigm to
examine a case study in defence R&D pro-
grammes within these frameworks. Lastly, les-
sons for Europe are drawn from the U.S. and
Israeli examples, specifically for the European
Defence Agency as the entity within the EU that
tackles defence R&D programmes at the pan-
European level.
2. The bureaucratic politics paradigm and
defence R&D
The bureaucratic politics paradigm is valu-
able for understanding the politics of national
security, including innovation activities related
to national security. George Appleby and Norton
Long pioneered the model in the 1940s and
1950s as a reaction to the politics-administra-
tion dichotomy, which presented politics and
policy administration as two separate realms,
with politics the domain of the selected office
holders and administration that of the profes-
sional civil servant (Appleby 1949; Long 1952).
In the 1960s, Francis Rourke developed it fur-
ther (Rourke 1984), and in the 1970s and 1980s
it was Guy Peters (Peters 1989) as well as
Graham Allison and Morton Halperin who re-
fined it to depict the political process as unfold-
ing in a government structure that is more like a
confederacy than a hierarchy and argued that it
is appropriate to treat organizations as well as
individuals as single policy actors. In these in-
stances, they claimed, an organization’s mission
– like a decision-maker’s bureaucratic position
or job title – becomes a strong predictor of its
policy stand on a particular issue (Allison/
Halperin 1972). During the late 1990s, Allison
and Zelikow applied the bureaucratic politics
approach to foreign and defence policies
(Allison/Zelikow 1999, 255–324). According to
the paradigm, policy decisions are not made by
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rational choice or by a unitary actor. Rather, they
are made by various actors that promote their
own interests as they compete for various stakes
and prizes. Positions on political issues are de-
termined by interests of actors, and political
decisions and policy outcomes are reached as a
result of a negotiated compromise between dif-
ferent positions.
To bureaucratic politics theorists, bureauc-
racy is anything but the mechanical and neutral
implementation of policy. Although politics and
policy execution involve different roles and
work cultures, responsibilities are often blurred.
The bureaucracy has at its fingertips informa-
tion and expertise that elected officials often
lack. As a result, bureaucrats are often delegated
authority from politicians, and can indirectly
make policy through consulting and advising.
Bureaucracy is not subject to the rules of de-
bate and questioning as are legislators and does
not have to be sensitive to political pressures
from constituents, which makes it less restricted
in its decisionmaking. Furthermore, bureaucrats
are driven by the interests of the ministries and
agencies with which they are affiliated, and they
constantly build, maintain and attempt to in-
crease their political support. In effect, they com-
pete with one another for budget resources, per-
sonnel slots, morale, access to key decision-
makers, autonomy of action, and scope of mis-
sions and roles. This competition produces
within each of the actors a common bureaucratic
culture, which in turn results in a pattern of re-
curring behaviour. This behaviour, commonly
referred to as “Mile’s Law”1 , can be summa-
rized by the adage: “Where you stand [on po-
litical issues] depends on where you sit [within
the bureaucracy].” In other words, policy posi-
tions are determined by – or are a function of –
the players’ perspective as developed by their
bureaucratic culture (Halperin/Kantor 1973, 3).
Certain resources and strategies are associ-
ated with successful bureaucratic politics. The
mere fact that bureaucratic politics occur sug-
gests that players do employ a variety of strate-
gies to maximize their rewards. Some bureauc-
racies are more successful than others in em-
ploying their assets – such as their expertise and
their responsibility for implementing policy –
in an effective manner. Rourke believes that
bureaucratic actors are more likely to succeed
if they possess socially appreciated expertise,
the support of their clientele or constituency
group, good leadership and organizational vi-
tality and energy. Thus, the acquisition, mainte-
nance and expansion of these four characteris-
tics become an objective of all organizations as
they engage in bureaucratic politics (Rourke
1984, 91).
The policy decisions made in an environ-
ment of bureaucratic politics is characterized by
negotiation, accommodation and compromise.
Decisions are made less through an executive
process and more through one of bargaining.
They also involve strong political ties to clien-
tele groups, to which bureaucracies look for
political security and support. Such ties are
based on an understanding that in return for the
clientele’s political support, which enables the
bureaucracy to prosper, it receives a say in
policymaking through the bureaucracy. Clien-
tele in bureaucratic politics refers not only to
politicians and their constituencies, but also to
external interest groups such as private compa-
nies.
One last notion of the bureaucratic politics
paradigm is worth mentioning, as it is impor-
tant for analysing the politics of defence R&D.
This is the concept of reform in bureaucratic
policies. A major percept of the bureaucratic
politics paradigm is that proposals for change
are neither technical nor neutral exercises, but
rather political phenomena generating intense
political pressures, conflicts and turmoil.
Reorganizations have political purposes, and
they are proposed and adopted for political rea-
sons and with political motives (Seidman 1976).
As a result, proposals for change and reform
view organizations and bureaucracies as politi-
cal objectives and objects, while the bureaucra-
cies themselves will have their own positions
on reorganization issues and their own plans for
what best serves the organizational interest.
The bureaucratic politics paradigm is useful
for studying the politics of defence R&D due to
the systematic framework it offers. Particularly
when analysing democratic governments, where
power is intentionally fragmented and dispersed
48 Guy Ben-Ari
among a multitude of actors, a paradigm that
explains how the different elements in govern-
ment make decisions is required. In an area such
as defence R&D, requiring specific expertise
and skills, the paradigm claims that policy will
be heavily influenced by experts yet involve
intense debate, consultation and compromise.
Declaratory policy steers and guides, but is not
automatically translated into programmes and
actions; these require continuous negotiations
and re-negotiations. Policy will be made through
a process that is fragmented, non-hierarchical
and non-monolithic. Politics, bureaucratic pro-
fessionalism, particularism, parochialism and
external interest groups colour this process, and
decisionmaking requires coordination and the
integration of various components and an aware-
ness of fiscal, organisational, political and cog-
nitive constraints. It also requires attention to
the fact that there is a lack of accountability to
the electorate by professional bureaucrats.
Lastly, in defence policy too, reform issues are
intensely political and raise questions of author-
ity, influence and access (Kozak 1988, 15).
3. U.S. and Israeli defence R&D: a view
through the bureaucratic politics prism
3.1. The United States
Throughout U.S. history, the country’s po-
litical agenda has swung repeatedly between one
that demands participation in international af-
fairs – as was the case when decisions were
reached to participate in the two World Wars –
and one that calls for isolationism, which was
extremely prevalent after the failure of
Wilsonianism and during the years of the Great
Depression, for example. Since World War II,
however, the U.S. has adopted a political agenda
of intensive international involvement with a
strong focus on overseas presence – specifically
military presence – and a belief in the country’s
role as leader of the “Free World”. It has com-
mitted troops to dozens of conflict areas, and
fought several large-scale wars, including Ko-
rea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf, all the while
prepared for confrontation, including the possi-
bility of a nuclear confrontation, with the So-
viet Union.
The understanding that a strong military is
necessary in order to implement the nation’s
policies overseas was translated into a research
agenda that emphasized defence R&D. Tech-
nology was viewed by the U.S. policymaker as
enabling the exchange of capital for labour: the
better the technology available, the fewer sol-
diers the military will need to draft and deploy,
and the fewer casualties it will sustain. In addi-
tion, advanced technology was deemed as pro-
viding the capability to achieve swift and deci-
sive victory on the battlefield. As early as 1945,
the Vannevar Bush report “Science – The End-
less Frontier” spurred the creation of a system
of public support for science and engineering
research following the realization that “scien-
tific research is absolutely essential to national
security”, as the experience of World War II was
deemed to have proven. During the Cold War,
victory was believed to be achievable if the race
for defence technology superiority over the So-
viet Union were won. And in the years follow-
ing the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. de-
fence planners continued to stress the need for
technological superiority and to warn that a
failure to understand and adapt [new technologies]
could lead today’s militaries into premature obso-
lescence and greatly increase the risks that such
forces will be incapable of effective operations
against forces with high technology (U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff 1996, 11).
A defence R&D policy – a coherent, formal
strategy for the support and exploitation of sci-
entific research for defence purposes – was
never formulated, however, except during World
War II. Instead, the relationship of the federal
government with the defence scientific commu-
nity and the defence industrial base are guided
by a set of arrangements and understandings
developed in response to particular needs and
endure for as long as they successfully accom-
modate the interests of the parties involved
(Morin 1993, 171).
The Department of Defence is the largest
supporter of R&D in the federal government,
although the Department of Energy, which han-
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dles defence-related nuclear research, and the
newly created Department of Homeland Secu-
rity, also play important roles. Today, the De-
partment of Defence accounts for more than half
of the total federal R&D portfolio. It is the larg-
est supporter of R&D in the U.S., its $75 billion
budget outstripping even the top players in the
private sector: Ford Motor ($7.5 billion), Pfizer
($7.1 billion), General Motors ($5.7 billion) and
IBM ($5 billion) (Lawrence 2004). In the 1980s,
the Department of Defence supported nearly
two-thirds of total federal R&D, but defence
cutbacks following the end of the Cold War
greatly reduced this share. Since 2001, however,
defence R&D spending has again increased dra-
matically.
In 2003, 2004 and 2005, record defence
R&D budgets were allocated, rising to $65 bil-
lion, $72 billion and $75 billion in those years,
respectively (Koizumi 2005). In U.S. defence
R&D, however, expenditures differ from most
R&D funding processes in that the distinction
between basic and applied research and devel-
opment, testing and evaluating is very sharply
drawn. The majority of funds ($57 billion, or
75 per cent in 2005) have traditionally gone to
the latter type of activities, while an almost stag-
nant funding stream of approximately $14 bil-
lion annually is directed at basic and applied
research (ibid.). In addition, most types of de-
fence related research have more than one po-
tential funding source. For example, the Defence
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA),
the Army Research Office, the Air Force Office
of Scientific Research, and the Office of Naval
Research all fund research on unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs). This ensures that no area of
research is dependent on one funding source for
its continued support.
The V-22 Osprey aircraft is a recent pro-
gramme that provides an interesting case study
for using the bureaucratic politics paradigm to
understand how funding is allocated to defence
R&D programmes in the U.S. It is a tilt-rotor
aircraft – one that takes off like a helicopter and
flies like a plane – that is designated to replace
the Marine Corps’ aging helicopters. The pro-
gramme has had a long and troubled R&D his-
tory since its initiation in 1986. In 2000, fatal
crashes of two prototypes claimed the lives of
23. By 2004, the programme had absorbed $8
billion in federal funding without producing a
single plane for regular military duty, and had
fallen years behind schedule. The Pentagon’s
original plan to purchase 913 planes has been
cut in half, and the cost per unit, which has
leaped from $29 million to $44 million, may
yet rise to $60 or even $80 million (Jones 2001,
46–7). Despite these facts, Congress, the Ma-
rine Corps, and the private sector have repeat-
edly joined forces to ensure the V-22 remains
an ongoing R&D effort.
Jones (2001) finds that consistent with the
central assumptions of the bureaucratic politics
paradigm, the decision to fund the development
of the V-22 Osprey emerged from a policy proc-
ess pervaded by role-based politics. The posi-
tions of the key actors within this decision-
making environment – the Department of De-
fence, Congress, Marine Corps, and the defence
companies involved in the development – were
directly related to the specific missions of their
organizations. These missions caused the actors
to have different interests and, therefore, dispa-
rate reasons for supporting or opposing the V-
22 programme. Conflict arose between the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches, because the
Department of Defence and Congress had com-
peting interests as well as opposed policy goals.
At one point, the Department of Defence chal-
lenged congressional budget authority by refus-
ing to spend V-22 appropriations. Conflict also
arose within the bureaucracy; the Office of the
Secretary of Defence, the civilian side of the
Department of Defence, strongly opposed the
programme while the Marine Corps, the main
customer for the aircraft, supported it.
The success of the Osprey’s proponents is
largely the result of the ability of one part of the
bureaucracy – the Marine Corps within the De-
partment of Defence – to rally the support of
Congress, which had enough formal authority
to control the program’s budget process, and of
the defence companies involved. To date, Con-
gress has invested billions of dollars in the pro-
gram, and its continuation affects the constitu-
encies of key members in relevant committees.
For example, the aircraft’s fuselages are
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manufactured in Boeing’s Ridley Township
plant, which is in the district of Rep. Curt Weldon
(R, PA), vice chairman of the House Armed Serv-
ices Committee and chairman of the Tactical Air
and Land Forces Subcommittee, which oversees
the V-22 program. Boeing employs 4,700 peo-
ple in this plant, and full production is expected
to add another 500 over the next decade (Parmley
2005). Other defence contractors and the smaller
companies that work for them have thousands
of jobs deeply tied to building the Osprey and
designing civilian spin-off models, and a long
history of solidarity when it comes to lobbying
for programs (Walker 1999, 180). Marine heli-
copters have aged to a point where they are near
the end of their life cycle with no ready replace-
ment except the V-22. Moreover, the Marine
Corps considers the Osprey well suited for the
missions that it is expected to perform in the new
global security environment. These actors, there-
fore, have a strong interest in ensuring the pro-
gram’s survival. Even if the aircraft’s rising cost
and most recent problems finally lead to its de-
mise, it has managed to survive as an R&D pro-
gramme for nearly two decades.
3.2. Israel
The Israeli political agenda was born out of
the Zionist ideals held by the Jewish leadership
in Palestine during the British Mandate. It
stressed the creation and sustaining of a Jewish
homeland that would be as self-sufficient as
possible. Since it was understood that the State
of Israel, when born, would be poor in natural
resources, in capital and in manpower, and since
it was clear from the start that its Arab neigh-
bours would do their utmost to destroy it, a key
political goal was – and to a great extent still
remains – the creation of a national economic
base that could supply as many of the country’s
needs in a time of emergency as possible. War
for Israeli decisionmakers is an extension of
politics by other means to the extent that their
political agenda is centred on the issue of en-
suring the nation’s survival as a Jewish State.
To achieve this political goal in the face of
continued threats against its very existence, the
Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) relies on superior
training, military intelligence, mobility and
firepower to achieve swift and decisive victo-
ries. Technology has traditionally been seen as
a major ingredient for providing these critical
capabilities. Initially dependent on foreign im-
ports, Israeli decisionmakers decided that it
should strive to be as self-sufficient as possible
when it came to defence technologies. From the
first days of its independence, therefore, Isra-
el’s political-military reality has forced it to
adopt R&D policies that ensured it could sup-
ply the majority of technological advantages to
its defence forces. On the demand side, the quan-
titative advantage of Israel’s Arab adversaries
impelled it to develop qualitative advantages in
the form of high technologies. On the supply
side, it was its skilled labour, available in rela-
tive abundance, which enabled it to develop
these technologies. In addition, it was expected
that investments in defence R&D would even-
tually lead to significant spin-offs to other sec-
tors of the economy, and were thus viewed as
being of strategic importance from an economic
point of view as well as a military one (Teubal
1993, 484–5).
Despite some – occasionally quite vehement
– objection from several government agencies
and ministries, from the late 1940’s to the Six
Day War of 1967, the Israeli defence R&D and
industrial base was expanded. This was done
largely through the creation of government firms
and laboratories, each responsible for a differ-
ent range of defence technologies. During this
period, however, the nation remained heavily
reliant on foreign suppliers for weapons plat-
forms – tanks, ships and airplanes – whose de-
velopment and production required sophisti-
cated technical know-how and enormous re-
sources that Israel did not possess. Czechoslo-
vakia, the first major arms supplier to Israel in
1948, severed its economic ties with the Jewish
state, which was deemed to be aligning itself
too tightly with the West. It was supplanted in
the 1950s by France, who became the leading
exporter of arms to Israel and was responsible
for the country’s first modern aircraft and nu-
clear facilities. When France declared an em-
bargo on Israel in the summer of 1967, the Is-
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raeli government decided that losing a critical
source of weapons twice within two decades was
quite enough, and initiated a defence R&D pro-
gramme aimed at becoming as self-sufficient as
possible in military capabilities. While a policy
of self-sufficiency in military equipment was
economically questionable for a country so
young and so poor, it was perceived to be a
sound political-military strategy that was in line
with the need to maintain a technological ad-
vantage over potential enemies. An increase in
defence R&D spending was begun, much of it
targeted at the development, re-engineering,
upgrading and producing of weapons platforms
and systems. Large-scale technology pro-
grammes, such as the Lavi (Hebrew for lion)
fighter aircraft and the Merkava (Chariot) tank,
were undertaken in the hopes of fulfilling the
country’s key military requirements (Ben-Ari
2006).
The Lavi jet fighter aircraft is an example of
bureaucratic politics at work in the Israeli de-
fence R&D environment. Originally intended
to be a small, cheap aircraft for ground-support
missions, it swiftly ballooned into a large and
very expensive multi-role aircraft. Senior offi-
cials in the Ministry of Defence, led by defence
minister Moshe Arens, supported the Lavi to
boost the country’s defence industrial base, as
did the right-wing Likud party of the Israeli
parliament, who also viewed it as an important
manifestation of Israel’s power and technologi-
cal achievement and as a way of ensuring Isra-
el’s continued autarky in weapons production.
The programme was led by Israeli Aircraft In-
dustries, a government-owned company and one
of the nation’s largest employers. In addition,
many other Israeli defence firms were involved
in its development, thus giving it the support of
a significant share of the country’s industrial
base. The Israeli Defence Forces, however, and
especially the Israeli Air Force, preferred the
American F-16 aircraft, which they considered
no less capable and much cheaper to procure.
So too did senior members of the Labour party,
including Itzhak Rabin (later to succeed Arens
as defence minister) who focused on the finan-
cial burden the project would place on the na-
tional budget (Perras 1989, 190). Two additional
important actors in the fight for the Lavi were
the U.S. government and the American defence
industrial base. Worried that the Israeli govern-
ment was developing an alternative to the F-16
that would not only be bought by the Israeli Air
Force but also compete with the American aero-
space industry on the global market, Washing-
ton proceeded to apply pressure on Israel to can-
cel the Lavi programme (Sadeh 2001, 70–1).
This included refusing Israel any financial as-
sistance for work related to the programme, as
well as a restructuring of the annual military
grant funds to Israel to enable the purchasing of
Israeli-made systems with up to 25 per cent of
those funds.2  Despite strong opposition, the Lavi
programme was cancelled in 1987 after a close
12-to-11 vote by the Israeli cabinet (Zackheim
1996, 252).
A bureaucratic politics analysis of the de-
bate whether or not to continue the Lavi project
highlights how, like in the U.S., the Israeli de-
fence bureaucracy does not speak with a single
voice. As in the U.S., the end-users of the sys-
tem being developed were able to out-manoeu-
vre their policy-setting colleagues in the defence
bureaucracy by rallying the support of key po-
litical and industrial actors, both local and for-
eign. In fact, the cancellation of the Lavi pro-
gramme marked a watershed in the primacy of
the local defence industry; its traditional role as
the chief developer and supplier of weapons to
the Israeli Defence Forces was questioned.
Eventually, the replacing of defence minister
Moshe Arens, who was an ardent supporter of
Israeli self-reliance in defence capabilities, with
the more collaboratively oriented and pro-
American Itzhak Rabin shifted the balance away
from large-scale, expensive R&D programmes.
In the case of the Lavi, political decisions
and policy outcomes were also the result of a
compromise between the positions of the vari-
ous actors, albeit hotly contested one. While the
bureaucracies of the defence firms and of the
government ministry that controlled many of
them were not able to leverage sufficient socially
appreciated expertise, support from their con-
stituency group, and good leadership to imple-
ment the policy they were advocating, they were
able to reach an acceptable agreement. Though
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few saw it at the time, Israeli security and the
Israeli industrial based benefited greatly from
the cancellation of the project. Components
manufactured by Israeli firms were installed on
F-16 aircraft sold to Israel, and the U.S. paid
Israel $100 million in offshore funding and an
undisclosed amount in termination liabilities.
More importantly, the U.S. agreed to fund the
majority of a collaborative R&D project on an
anti-ballistic missile system3 , and signed a
memorandum of understanding with Israel that
applied many elements of the civilian U.S.-Is-
raeli free trade agreement to commerce in de-
fence equipment (ibid., 254).
As a result of the decision made on the Lavi
project, the role of the Israeli industry in sup-
plying the IDF was scaled down and its power
as an actor on the political scene diminished.
Today, the government continues to rely on lo-
cally-developed systems to guarantee the IDF’s
qualitative edge, but instead of contracting with
them to build large weapons platforms, atten-
tion was shifted to smaller, R&D-intensive pro-
grammes that would guarantee superiority in the
battlefield through technologies that were not
available from other sources. These smaller pro-
grammes include unmanned aerial vehicles,
electro-optic and infrared sensors, radars, com-
munications, and command and control systems.
The industries initially resented this approach,
claiming they required a steady stream of or-
ders from the Ministry of Defence for all types
of military products in order to maintain a skilled
workforce and a healthy industrial infrastruc-
ture, but eventually adapted to the shift in gov-
ernment policy (Lifshitz 2003).
4. Lessons for the European Union
Unlike the U.S. and Israel, most European
governments have not viewed defence R&D as
a strategic element in their defence policies.
After World War II, European military strate-
gies became heavily focused on territorial de-
fence against a possible attack by the Soviet
Union and its allies. Since the U.S. was an as-
sured partner in the event of an invasion, it could
also be relied upon to provide not just man-
power, but also equipment in defence of its Eu-
ropean allies. When the Cold War ended, de-
fence investments were reduced, including those
for innovations in military technologies. As a
result, defence R&D investments in Europe to-
day are only one-fifth of those in the U.S.
(Adams et al. 2004, 122).
Recent developments in the international
security environment are beginning to change
this trend. As the defence strategies of many
European nations are shifting from territorial
defence to expeditionary security and humani-
tarian relief operations, certain capability short-
falls are becoming apparent. These include the
inability of European forces to interoperate with
the U.S. in the first Gulf War, communications
and interoperability problems among partners
in the Bosnia peacekeeping forces, difficulties
encountered coordinating the NATO air cam-
paign over Kosovo, problems in force coordi-
nation in Afghanistan, disagreements and
interoperability issues over the invasion of Iraq,
and challenges of assisting in tsunami relief
operations in Southeast Asia. These events have
given rise to a sense in many European govern-
ments that they need a common, operational
capability that can be deployed swiftly and that
can operate without the support of the U.S.
(Flournoy et al. 2005, 17).
While there continue to be many disagree-
ments on this matter, a number of steps have
been taken since 2003 toward making it a real-
ity. In the summer of 2004, the EU announced
the Headline Goal 2010, which builds on the
Helsinki Headline Goal of 1999 and expands
and deepens EU commitments to strengthening
its military and civilian capabilities with a strong
emphasis on overseas coalition operations. At
the same time, the European Council established
the European Defence Agency, a European-level
agency responsible for armaments policy and
oversight of the Member States’ military capa-
bilities. It also proclaimed the creation of thir-
teen EU Battlegroups, each made up of 1,500
troops, which can be deployed within five days
and operate for thirty days in a range of sce-
narios. Several independent European opera-
tions were also undertaken: a policing opera-
tion in Bosnia, a military peacekeeping mission
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in Macedonia, and a short peacekeeping opera-
tion in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Therefore, despite the inability in the summer
of 2005 to ratify the European Constitution, it
seems clear that the EU is looking for capabili-
ties that will enable it to participate more effec-
tively in overseas operations, whether these are
high-intensity wars or peacekeeping, conflict
prevention or humanitarian relief operations.
In order to undertake such operations effec-
tively, however, the EU is aware that it still lacks
certain critical technologies, such as unmanned
aerial vehicles that can reconnoitre an area of
operations for extended periods of time, com-
munications systems that can interlink radio
systems from different countries into a single
mobile network, and navigation, timing and
positioning satellites for radio-navigation, track-
ing and surveillance. Though some international
collaboration to develop these technologies will
take place, particularly with the U.S., the ma-
jority of the work on obtaining these capabili-
ties will be done solely amongst the EU’s Mem-
ber States. To date, collaborative defence R&D
has been undertaken within the framework of
multinational entities such as the Western Eu-
ropean Armaments Group (WEAG), the West-
ern European Armaments Organisation
(WEAO), and the Joint Organisation for Coop-
eration on Armaments, known by its French
acronym OCCAR (Organization Conjoint pour
la Cooperation en Matiere d’Armament). Some
security-related R&D has also been undertaken
under the auspices of the European Commis-
sion’s Framework Programme (James 2004, 98–
106).
The key player in guiding and coordinating
future European defence R&D, however, will
be the European Defence Agency. Since its crea-
tion in July 2004, it has begun to integrate the
R&D activities of WEAG and WEAO, and there
is talk of it incorporating OCCAR (Tigner 2004,
4). In July of 2005, the Agency’s Research and
Technology (R&T) Directorate announced that
it had identified the research areas for its first
round of R&D projects, both of involve devel-
oping long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles.
The research focus will be on vehicle
survivability in operations and on digital data
links between the vehicles and their control sta-
tions, technology fields that are not addressed
by currently ongoing European R&D pro-
grammes. The Agency will fund the projects out
of its own budget, which is made up of contri-
butions from each Member State (except Den-
mark, which has chosen not to be involved in
any defence related EU activity). In addition,
the R&T Directorate identified more than ten
other critical technology areas, and these may
be addressed separately by ad-hoc cooperation
projects by Member States, by future studies
funded by the Agency, or by initiatives within
the private sector. In December 2005, Javier
Solana, EU High Representative for Security
and Defence Policy, announced the need for
boosting and coordinating defence R&D spend-
ing amongst all 25 Member States, and recom-
mended to EU leaders that the EDA lead this
effort (European Defence Agency 2005, 1).
As the European Defence Agency initiates
its first R&D projects and takes on those of its
predecessors, it would do well to learn the les-
sons that bureaucratic politics – as seen in the
case studies of the U.S. and Israel – can teach.
One key lesson is that the defence bureauc-
racy, which includes defence planners and mili-
tary leaders, does not always speak with one
voice. Political decisionmakers may be required
to resolve disputes between defence policy for-
mulators and the operational elements tasked
with policy implementation. Despite the fact that
it is the latter that will ultimately operate the
end product in exercises and missions, they may
not share the strategic visions of their civilian
counterparts. In both the Osprey and the Lavi
examples, the primary customer – the U.S. Ma-
rine Corps in the former and the Israeli Air Force
in the latter – was able to make its voice heard
despite pressures from the civilian part of the
bureaucracy by rallying its clientele and con-
vincing decisionmakers at the highest levels, but
this need not always be the case. The bureau-
cratic politics paradigm teaches us that a defence
organisations interests are guided by its own
bureaucratic culture, and not necessarily by the
requirement to successfully enforce political
decisions through military operations. There-
fore, it is not enough for political leaders to for-
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mulate defence policies and expect programmes
to emerge that will develop equipment to meet
the capability requirements of those policies.
Politicians must understand that constant nego-
tiations and compromises with the various ele-
ments of the defence bureaucracy are crucial if
R&D programmes are to remain in line with
their broader defence policies.
Another key lesson is that the industrial base
supporting defence will be changed by decisions
affecting large defence R&D programmes, and
that these decisions will therefore involve in-
dustry interest groups. American aerospace
companies and the sub-contractors they work
with would have suffered a significant blow had
the Osprey programme been terminated, and
much of the research undertaken for the pro-
gramme would have been cancelled. This would
have been contrary to the U.S. defence policy
described earlier in this paper, which views the
nation’s ability to produce innovative military
technologies as a strategic asset. In Israel, the
decision to cancel the Lavi had far-reaching
consequences for the domestic industrial base’s
ability to design and develop manned fighter
aircraft, and it is unlikely that the capacity to do
so remains today. However, this too was in line
with the new national defence strategy that
viewed the U.S. as a reliable partner from whom
certain military technologies could be procured.
In parallel, Israel managed to shift much of the
codified as well as the tacit knowledge base from
the Lavi programme into adjacent technology
areas, including avionics, missiles and
unmanned aerial vehicles, and today has secured
its position as a world leader in these fields.
Therefore, despite strong opposition by in-
terest groups as part of the bureaucratic politics
process, some of Europe’s defence industrial
capacities must be allowed to diminish. As se-
curity requirements change, so too should the
defence strategies and, subsequently, the indus-
trial bases supporting these requirements. The
security requirements of the EU are still in the
process of being formulated, and the EDA ought
to continuously compare them to the capacities
of the European industrial base and evaluate the
ability to provide them. For example, if the Eu-
ropean security strategy no longer foresees the
need to defend the continent from a massive
offensive by ground forces from its Eastern
neighbours, the utility of preserving the indus-
trial capacity to manufacture large numbers of
battle tanks and armoured personnel carriers
must be questioned. At the same time, since the
EU wishes to become more active in crisis man-
agement and conflict resolution operations far
from its borders, new capabilities for intelligence
gathering, long-range transportation and logis-
tics must be developed. Pressure from European
defence companies in the form of alliances with
certain parts of the defence bureaucracy must
be anticipated and addressed.
A third key lesson for the EU is that the sci-
ence and technology elements in a defence R&D
programme are usually not objectively sup-
ported. Instead, these programmes operate in
what has been termed a “procurement culture”4 ,
where success is measured by the development,
acquisition and fielding of platforms and sys-
tems. Defence ministries, militaries, political
leaders, legislators and defence companies de-
bate which platforms and systems should be
given priority in the current budget, and not
about the proper balance between immediate and
future needs. Legislators accept this process,
since they can use it to control the inflow of
money and the rise of employment for its con-
stituents (Morin 1993, 56–7.). In both the Os-
prey and the Lavi programmes, the scientists and
engineers working for the government or mili-
tary had little say in the decisionmaking proc-
ess, although they were probably those with the
most knowledge about how long the pro-
grammes would take and what scientific and
technological breakthroughs they would de-
mand. In order to assess the scientific and tech-
nical elements of a defence R&D programme,
in effect remaining a “smart customer”, the gov-
ernment itself must maintain skilled technical
personnel. It cannot rely exclusively on the pri-
vate sector for this, since it is the private sector
that will also be supplying the product. The EDA
must therefore build a cadre of scientists and
engineers, which it could directly employ or
approach as consultants, to provide it with ob-
jective, expert advice on planned and ongoing
R&D efforts. By removing the scientific and
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technological expertise from the bureaucratic
politics game, a neutral assessment of defence
R&D activities can be made available to all ac-
tors.
5. Summary
An analysis of defence R&D using the bu-
reaucratic politics paradigm can provide crucial
insights into the decision- and policy-making
processes affecting innovation. Since govern-
ment use their militaries as a means to achiev-
ing political ends, then government decisions
to invest in defence capabilities are reflections
of political agendas that incorporate the possi-
bility of using force in support of national strat-
egies. However, a closer look at the bureaucratic
politics paradigm and at examples from the U.S.
and Israel tells us that there is more to invest-
ments in defence R&D than political decisions
taken by heads of state. Decisions made by po-
litical leaders will steer and guide the actions of
bureaucracies, but are not automatically trans-
lated into accomplishments. In the case of de-
fence bureaucracies, there is not one but two
group of actors in this game: the civilian de-
fence strategy and policymakers, and the uni-
formed implementers of those policies. For
policy to be implemented in the manner desired
by political leaders, continuous negotiations and
re-negotiations with the defence bureaucrats and
the industry and political leaders they turn to
for support are needed. All these actors will at-
tempt to affect the final policy that is formu-
lated so that it maximizes the benefits to the
constituencies they represent.
Thus, defence R&D policy takes place in a
bargaining arena rather than in a hierarchical
command structure, through a process that is
fragmented and erratic. Decisionmakers must
coordinate the various components and integrate
them effectively. They must also possess an
understanding of the fiscal, organisational, po-
litical and cognitive constraints that each of the
actors faces.
An awareness of the bureaucratic politics
paradigm can shed new light on decisions made
on the U.S. Osprey and the Israeli Lavi R&D
programmes. It can also serve as a wake-up call
to European defence R&D planners, especially
those of the European Defence Agency, and
provide them with a preview of what to expect
as they initiate the first EU-run programmes. The
actors in the European defence sector know that
in order to affect the defence R&D decision-
making process, they must influence the insti-
tutions formulating this process. European po-
litical and defence policy leaders must rec-
ognize how this influence is brought to bear,
and how they can steer it in the direction that
their constituents have mandated them to fol-
low.
ANMERKUNGEN
1 For the origin of “Mile’s Law” see Neustadt/May
(1986, 157).
2 Until then, all funds provided by the United States
had to be used to purchase defence equipment manu-
factured solely in America.
3 Work on this system continues to this day within
the framework of the Arrow program.
4 The term was first used by James Fallows (1981,
62–9).
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